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Abstract 
In international relations small states are either discarded as irrelevant, unimportant, or weak; 
held in high regard as potential movers and shakers in especially smart or niche diplomacy 
areas; powerful in blocs; or as a non-classification, that is undeserving of a unique type separate 
from the world body of states. Regardless of varying perceptions, small states exist and more 
so, they exist with foreign policies. This study examines what drives the foreign policies of the 
southern African small states of Botswana, the Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, the 
Seychelles and Swaziland. It finds that state size is important in shaping the foreign policies of 
these southern African small states but that it is not mutually exclusive from other typical 
domestic and international determinants which play roles in conditioning most states’ foreign 
policies. Moreover, defence of national interest features as a common and undeniable primary 
foreign policy objective of these states. 
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Introduction:  
A common perception of small states is reflected in the following metaphor. If one were to 
position states as contestants in a race, then when world powers and superpowers would be 
close to the finish, small states would be just out of the block, marginally better perhaps than 
microstates – the contestants still warming up. Crowards (2002, 143), Maass (2009, 65) and 
Sutton (2011, 141) are correct in their summations that defining small states is conceptually 
problematic and that within small state literature definitions remain imprecise and often 
pejorative. Small states have been judged as vulnerable victims or reactors to external 
circumstances that often have no option but to ‘gang up or opt out’ of international politics 
(Benwell 2011, 199). Their vulnerability, that is they are especially susceptible to risk of harm 
due to their ‘openness, insularity, weakness and dependence’, among others, reflects political, 
economic, social and environmental dimensions (The Commonwealth 1997). Others have 
highlighted how small states are defined by their limitations, for example, their inability to 
defend themselves against military attack by a larger power (see Elman 1995, 171)1.   
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This study aims to investigate what drives the foreign policies of small states in southern 
Africa? It does so by combining small state literature with that of the so-called ‘typical’ 
determinants of foreign policy in order to ascertain whether size, per se, plays a primary role 
in determining what drives the foreign policies of southern African small states. Naturally not 
all possible determinants shaping foreign policy can be investigated for the purpose of this 
study. 
 
Making sense of ‘smallness’ 
Is smallness but a matter of relativity? For example, in terms of geographical size, relative to 
its Southern African counterparts, Lesotho is smaller than South Africa but larger than 
Swaziland. Can the same be said for regional location? Are small states in Africa more 
vulnerable or less vulnerable than those in Europe, for example, and does this play a role in 
determining foreign policy? Elman (1995, 171) and Handel (1990, 11) circumvent the 
conceptual clarity dilemma by referring to ‘weak’, ‘small’, and ‘insecure’ states 
interchangeably. Size, reflected as power or relative strength, does matter in a traditional sense 
as, according to Hey (2003, 85), it ‘has an absolute effect on foreign policy scope’. Elman 
(1995, 171) equally contends that access to resources, political and economic, has an 
unavoidable impact on foreign policy choices. Size is also ‘related to a state’s interdependence 
with other states’ (Breuning 2007, 149). 
 
In contrast, rather than being trapped by size, small states may be able to use their ‘smallness’ 
to their advantage in international politics (Aiyar 2008). In many respects well-governed small 
states are among the most competitive in the world; consider Switzerland and Singapore ranked 
first and second in the World Economic Forum’s 2015/2016 global competitiveness index 
(GCI). Southern African small state, Mauritus, ranks at number 46 (see Table 1.1), three spaces 
ahead of Southern Africa’s regional power, South Africa, making it one of only two African 
states to feature in the most competitive 50 states in the world. By the very nature of their 
natural circumstances small states can become ‘emergency’ agenda-setters, in terms of calls 
for climate change (Benwell 2011, 200), as resilient, innovative actors (Cooper and Shaw 2009, 
1-2; Wignaraja, Lezama, and Joiner 2004) as global leaders ‘at the forefront of positive change’ 
in the world (Ban Ki Moon 2015) and ‘as architects of a culture of cooperation’ (Adam 2014). 
Moreover small states may be individually weaker than others but collectively they can prove 
very influential in international relations; as Keohane (cited in Gunasekara 2015, 213) reminds 
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us, ‘if Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be 
studied as carefully as the giant’. 
 
Whereas quantifiable definitions reflecting the size of a state (see Neumann and Gstöhl 2004; 
Thorhallsson 2012) provide us with points of easier comparison, by measuring such objective 
criteria as population size, physical territory2, and national income or Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP); they do not offer insight into how state size reflects related constraints on or advantages 
to small state foreign policy choices in international relations. Qualitative, relational definitions 
highlight the following: perception (Hey 2003, 3); ideational factors (such as image and 
identity) (Brunn 1999 and Gvalia, Siroky et al. 2013, 100); small states as norm entrepreneurs 
(Ingebritsen 2006); state influence; initiative of small state leaders (Thorhallsson 2006, 
Scheldrup 2014); and internal bureaucratic efficiency (Thorhallson 2000).  
 
Southern African small states 
This study defines Southern Africa small states in terms of both quantifiable and qualitative 
definitions. In the Southern African region, the World Bank (2016) and the Commonwealth 
(2016) classify Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mauritius, Swaziland and the Seychelles as small 
states. Although it is not a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
the Comoros, a small island state, is nevertheless a member of the Africa Union (AU) and 
forms part of the southern African region. Although the Commonwealth (2016) defines small 
states quantifiably in terms of population size of 1,5 million or less, it still refers to Botswana 
(2,2 million), Lesotho (2,1 million) and Namibia (2,4 million) as small as ‘they share similar 
characteristics’. Mauritius and Swaziland each has very similar population numbers of just over 
1,2 million, the Seychelles has 91 000 and the Comoros has around 780 000 (see Table 1.1 for 
more specific data). All seven of these small southern African states fit neatly into the World 
Bank’s definition of small, as having a population of 10 million or less. As stipulated in the 
literature, although size of territory and population can have practical implications on economic 
growth and internal stability. Breuning (2007, 149) is correct in her assertion that the size of a 
state is ‘a very rough guide to estimating its foreign policy behaviour’. After all, surely 
regardless of size, all states tend to have a policy outlining their view of the world beyond their 
borders and their goals and position within it. 
 
Table 1.1 Southern African small states in figures 
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State 
 
Total 
area in 
km² 
Populati
on 
(2014) 
HDI 
value  
(2015) 
HDI 
rank 
(2015) 
African 
Development 
Indicator 
(World Bank) 
(2013) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
2015/2016 
Botswana 582,000 2,219,93
7 
0.698 106 Upper Middle 
Income 
71 (4.2) 
Comoros 2,235  780,971 0.503 159 Low Income No data 
Lesotho 
 
30,355 2,109,19
7 
0.497 161 Low Middle 
Income (LDC) 
113 (3.7) 
Mauritius 
 
2,040 1,260,93
4 
0.777 63 Upper Middle 
Income 
46 (4.4) 
Namibia 
 
825,615 2,402,85
8 
0.628 
 
126 Upper Middle 
Income 
85 (4.0) 
Seychelles 
 
455 91,526 0.772 64 High income  97 (3.9) 
Swaziland 
 
17 364 1,269,11
2 
0.531 
 
150 Lower Middle 
Income 
128 (3.4) 
Author’s compilation of data drawn from the following sites: SADC 2012; World Bank 2013; 
2014; UNDP 2015; WEF 2016.   
 
Foreign policy and small states 
Foreign policy is ‘the process by which states identify goals in the international system … 
acting on the international stage … in pursuit of their … national interests’ (Nanjira 2010, 330). 
Of course pursuing national interest might be challenging for those states who are more 
vulnerable than others. Despite common challenges small states may not necessarily display 
the same foreign policy behaviour (Hey 2002, 213 and 2003, 6). Even if they did, it would be 
simplistic and fallacious to assume that this was because they are similar types3 of states, but 
rather the explanation should be sought in the context-specific determinants that influenced 
their independent foreign policy choices. Baillie (in Hey 2003, 7) adds that a small state’s 
foreign policy behaviour depends on its historical context; its internal bureaucracy, and its 
negotiation behaviour. Chowdhury (2012, 3) highlights James Rosenau’s suggestions that size, 
level of development and political system would impact small state behaviour. Similarly, Hey 
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(2003, 9-10) acknowledges Rosenau, using, and slightly modifying, his inductive approach to 
foreign policy analysis by exploring the individual, state and system levels. In a similar three-
step, synthetic framework, Carlsnaes (2007, 19) suggests an alternate approach to explaining 
foreign policy action in three dimensions: structural, dispositional, and intentional. Structural 
factors or determinants, for example domestic and international, are the powerful, underlying 
influences affecting foreign policy actors’ choices. These determinants may restrict or facilitate 
action or inaction. 
 
Some scholars have separated domestic (internal) from international (external) determinants of 
foreign policy-making with military proficiencies, economic circumstances and type of 
government emerging as prominent domestic drivers and polarity, geopolitics4 and regional 
context as the most important international influences directing foreign policy pursuits 
(Blanton and Kegley 2016, 74-80; Morgan and Webber 2002, 226-230). In an effort to embrace 
an historical context and its impact on foreign policy choices, Nanjira (2010, 304-305) adds 
colonisation, decolonisation, and membership in international organisations as important 
international determinants of foreign policy. Masters (2012: 33) reminds us that although 
governments have the final decision on foreign policy, it would be remiss to ignore potential 
roles played by nongovernmental sources (including business, academics, the media and 
research organisations) in governments’ decision making. Handel (1990) argues that domestic 
determinants are less important to small states in their foreign policymaking because the 
international, structural or systemic influences will simply overwhelm their limited 
capabilities, constrain choice, and as a result will most often dictate foreign policy decisions of 
small states. Hey (2002, 213) adds that ‘many small states enjoy limited foreign policy 
bureaucracies’. As such, the challenges facing small states require international cooperation in 
order to meet them, not domestic measures, according to Asgrimsson (2003), who adds that a 
small state’s ‘fundamental interests, such as peace and security … a sound economy, a healthy 
environment and sustainable use of natural resources, cannot be defended except through 
international cooperation.’ Bjol (1971), however, adopts a more middle of the road position in 
suggesting that the behaviour of small states will vary according to not only geopolitics and 
type of international system in which they function, but also internal governance.  
 
As Carlsnaes portends foreign policy straddles the ‘boundary between the internal and the 
external spheres of a state’ (2008, 86) or as Hill (2003, 23) describes it, foreign policy is at the 
‘hinge’ of domestic and international politics. Domestic and international determinants 
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influence the direction of foreign policy formulation. Indeed they are the fuel mobilising a 
state’s global relations. Some contend that there is no separation between the domestic and 
international and so a focus on the intermestic (see Huijgh and Warlick 2016, 5), a combination 
of these factors, might allow for a potentially greater understanding of the very real 
complexities guiding a state’s foreign policy. Regardless of the terminology used, states adapt 
their foreign policy based on internal and external conditions. How a state links itself, or is 
linked, to its immediate and greater neighbourhoods characterises the heart of its foreign policy.  
Foreign policy issues and interests often pull rank as states push and pull for position in a 
globalising world. What remains of primary concern to a state is its national interest and what 
it must do to work in favour of this interest.  
 
Indeed, to a large extent Holsti’s (1995, 84-108) four general purposes of foreign policy remain 
common to most states, although emphasis on priority of purpose may differ, and these are 
their security, their autonomy (dissimilar from their sovereignty); their welfare; and their status 
and prestige. In updated terms 21st century security may now reflect as human and 
environmental security issues, among others, not only conventional military security; and 
development and growth might best describe Holsti’s ‘welfare’ role. However, small states are 
diverse in many ways, from most to least developed, from having high levels of political 
stability to being on the verge of state failure, and as such their priorities may be just as varied 
(Súilleabháin 2014).  
 
As Handel (1990, 36) contends, small states will be ‘continually preoccupied with the question 
of survival’ due to their inability to defend themselves against more powerful states.  Although 
the context of this is embedded in a Cold War power reality, the question of survival holds true 
today if one alters the circumstances to reflect the current positive and negative characteristics 
defining small state realities. The Commonwealth (1997, 9-12; and 2016), the World Bank 
(2016) and Feeny and Mcgillivray (2010) refer to the characteristics5 and development 
challenges facing small states. Political and social resilience (in terms of political stability); 
weakness (in terms of power politics limited military capabilities mean that small states must 
often rely on larger states to maintain their security); vulnerability in terms of trade (both as 
importers of necessity goods such as fuel and food and heavy reliance on foreign markets for 
a narrow range of export products); limited capacity (usually weak capacity in public and 
private sectors domestically and weak institutional capacity to participate fully in international 
forums); insularity and remoteness (landlocked and island states usually spend more on 
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transport costs and access to world markets reducing their competitiveness compared to larger 
more enabled neighbours); exposure to natural disasters and environmental change (the 
consequences of climate change and natural disasters for example droughts, hurricanes and 
cyclones); and dependence (which reflects for example, in economic terms as dependence on 
large levels of official development assistance (ODA)), may individually or collectively foster 
specific foreign policy orientations6.  
 
In Breuning’s (2007, 152) view, there are four distinct orientations, the first of which, 
consensus-oriented foreign policy, implies the agents of foreign policymaking in a small state 
intentionally align their foreign policy actions with the desires of a larger state that has some 
political, economic or military influence over them because they recognise that their state lacks 
the resources to act independently. Small states with compliant foreign policies, the second 
orientation, align their foreign policies with a larger state because they have been pressured to 
do so because of this dependence. The third orientation, counterdependent foreign policy 
denotes a ‘defiant reaction to dependence’ by small state leaders frustrated and desperate ‘to 
reduce the consequences of that dependence’. A particular strategy in this type of foreign policy 
may be what Gunasekara (2015, 213) refers to as small state self-reliance. That is small states 
may use various resistance strategies, such as diplomacy, or using their remoteness to their 
advantage in proclaiming neutrality on issues important to larger powers, in an effort to 
‘increase the extent to which [they] are able to secure their national interests’. The fourth 
orientation, compensation, is the most antagonistic, and reflects foreign policies that provokes 
powerful states in order ‘to appease domestic audiences’. These orientations are difficult to 
discern without intimate knowledge of the foreign policymaking processes within small states, 
though explanations can be sought in exploring the motivations driving state leaders to act.  
 
All things being equal, states have foreign policies determined by domestic and international 
factors. Are small southern African states’ foreign policies driven by atypical determinants or 
by the same or similar factors as other larger states? Does their size play a primary role? In 
summary the following overlapping domestic and international determinants may influence 
small state foreign policy behaviour to varying degrees: national interests; security 
(environmental; military; human); economic circumstances; type of government; foreign 
policy bureaucracy; nongovernmental sources; trade; geopolitics (location; regional context, 
natural resources); historical context; membership in international organisations (status and 
prestige); challenges and issues facing states. Having surveyed the literature on small states 
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and foreign policy behaviour, the next step is to explore which determinants are applicable to 
the southern African small states context. 
 
Foreign policy and southern African small states 
Literature exploring the foreign policy of small states in southern Africa is limited7. If we relate 
smallness to weakness, then history is replete with examples of how smaller states are 
vulnerable to the interests of more powerful states. For example, apartheid South Africa 
constrained the foreign policy choices of its landlocked neighbours Lesotho and Swaziland for 
decades. Vale and Matlosa (1995) and Matlosa (1997, 117-118) refer to the ‘confrontational, 
‘patronising and paternalistic role’, the South Africa played in the region. It impacted not only 
‘the economic abilities’ of these states but also ‘the content, context and pattern of their foreign 
policies’. Black, Mugyenyi and Swatuk (1988) also provide a review of the challenges faced 
by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in their relationship with South Africa in the southern 
African region during apartheid. Santho and Sejanamane (1990) offer a prospective on southern 
Africa post-apartheid, but its content is Lesotho top-heavy. By 1995 Vale and Matlosa suggest 
that southern Africa’s prospects ‘to make new beginnings’ were apparent and signalled hope 
for the region.  
 
Matlosa offers two important contributions, the first in 1997, which explores vulnerable states 
in southern Africa in relation to South Africa’s post-apartheid regional role, and the second, in 
1998, which explores political instability and the fragility of state systems in southern African 
small states. The studies are limited to the experience of only two small states in the region, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. Although the first paper highlights South Africa’s foreign policy in 
the region, it does offers insight into the vulnerability of the two small states and calls into 
question their ‘viability as autonomous political entities’ (Matlosa 1997, 129). The second 
paper explains how political liberalisation efforts in both states have weakened their state 
systems resulting in conflict between the governing authorities and organs of civil society and 
these findings help to contextualise the domestic political situations and levels of stability in 
the states. However, it does not explain how this context informed or conditioned, if at all, 
foreign policy action or inaction.  
 
More recent reviews of African small states are offered by Dömeland and Sander (2007), who 
suggest that due to their smaller populations, these states are less likely to suffer ethnic conflict 
compared with their larger African counterparts; and Aiyar (2008), who provides an economic 
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slant on the comparative performance of these states in relation to various global rankings. But 
what prominent factors drive the foreign policies of the seven southern African small states of 
Botswana, the Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles and Swaziland? At stated 
previously, it should be noted that the discussion that follows is not an exhaustive list of 
determinants and naturally the contextual realities of these states likely involves a far more 
complex and detailed relationship of actors and agency than this brief overview will allow. 
That said, the paper will now split into exploration of the island/coastal states and the 
landlocked states (LLS) for ease of discussion. 
 
The island/coastal states 
As a starting off point, it may be expedient to ascertain the declared foreign policies of the 
southern African small states, before exploring which prominent structural factors might 
condition their formation. The Comoros’ Minister of External Relations and Cooperation, Dr 
Abdoulkarim Mohamed, is tasked with overseeing the Ministry’s relations with the Comoros’ 
Diaspora, La Francophonie and the Arab world. In his speech at the UN in September 2015, 
President, at the time, Ikililou Dhoinine (2015, 23-24) of the Comoros, affirmed the following 
international policy concerns as indicative of his own country’s worries: ending poverty in all 
its forms, eradicating hunger, promoting sustainable agriculture in order to guarantee food 
security, and making water available to all among others. However, what stood out most in 
terms of the Comoros’ national interests was Dhoinine’s emphasis on the size of the Comoros 
as a natural hindrance to its ability to add to international security efforts when “in a small 
country like mine … we must be on the front lines to defend our dignity”. The President was 
referring to the Comoros’ territorial integrity which the country does not yet have, more 
specifically he was raising the issue of Mayotte, one of the Comoros’ main islands which is 
administered by France8, as well as another more recent break down in bilateral relations 
between the two countries over this issue (see below).  
 
In Mauritius, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade is 
responsible for implementing Mauritian foreign policy. The Ministry’s Foreign Affairs 
Division is divided into seven focus areas, comprising central administration; bilateral 
divisions in three geographical areas: Asia, the Middle and Far East (Bilateral I); Europe, 
Australasia and the Americas (Bilateral II); and Africa and the Indian Ocean (Bilateral III); 
multilateral divisions (political and economic) and a division related to protocol. An additional 
two divisions are dedicated to regional integration and international trade. Eighteen diplomatic 
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missions abroad support the Ministry. Mauritius’ top five foreign policy goals are to promote 
its national interests; to promote democratic ideas internationally; to expand its trade and grow 
its economy and to ‘fully integrate Mauritius into the global economy’; and to encourage its 
participation in regional integration in order to foster sustainable development (The Ministry 
2016). The principles underlying its foreign policy are territorial integrity, equality among 
states, and respect for human rights. 
 
The Seychelles has a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Transport. As a member of the 
Commonwealth, the Ministry subscribes to the principles laid out in the Commonwealth 
Charter.  Especially pertinent to the Seychelles is the Charter’s recognition of the needs of 
small and vulnerable states. The small size of the Seychelles is acknowledged by its Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Transport, Joel Morgan, as a challenge for the Republic in its efforts to 
promote its foreign policy objectives. Morgan refers to the Ministry as often the Seychelles’ 
first line of defence ensuring ‘that its international and diplomatic obligations are met’ (MFA 
2016). Smart diplomacy is a special tactic employed in niche areas such as spearheading the 
blue economy initiative and highlighting the consequences of climate change. The climate 
change challenges facing the Seychelles do influence its foreign policy and these are summed 
up succinctly by the Seychelles Ambassador to the UN, Ronald Jumeau: ‘It’s not just a question 
of islands slipping under. People think it’s a very simple story, but we would become a failed 
state. Our economy would collapse.’ In 2014 the Seychelles President James Michel met with 
the President of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to discuss assistance for the 
Seychelles in the development of its blue economy9, in particular sustainable development of 
its fisheries. In his February 2016 State of the Nation address, President Michel declared that 
in the previous year the image and visibility of the Seychelles had ‘been reinforced and 
recognised’ on the international scene.  
 
Namibia refers to itself as a ‘small developing country’. Namibia has a Ministry of International 
Relations and Cooperation (much like its neighbour to the south) which is tasked with the 
central aim of formulating and implementing Namibia’s foreign policy and its actions in 
international relations. The main foreign policy objectives, outlined in article 96 of Namibia’s 
Constitution, are the promotion and protection of Namibia’s national security and territorial 
integrity; economic growth, sustainable development and regional cooperation; international 
peace and security; and Namibian and African ‘standing and influence in world affairs’ (MFA 
2016). There is a prominent link between foreign policy and the aspirations of the Namibian 
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people as a guiding force. Indeed as declared by the Foreign Minister in 1997, Theo-Ben 
Gurirab, ‘foreign policy, at its best, is an externalisation of domestic order and public policies’ 
(cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004, 48).  
 
Trade, economics and geopolitics 
As a small island developing state (SID), the Comoros (also known as the Comoro Islands) is 
located off the south-east coast of Africa in the Mozambique Channel. It consists of four major 
islands: the largest of which is Grande Comore (Ngazidja), Moheli (Mwali to the lo), Anjouan 
(Nzwani), and Mayotte (Maore) which the Comoros declares as its territory but which remains 
governed by France. The Comoros has very few profitable natural resources and is heavily 
dependent on foreign direct investment and aid and according to its governmental website, high 
profile donors for development projects in the Comoros include the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Arab Bank for Development in Africa (BADEA) among others (Union des Comores 2016). Its 
main imports are fuel, cars and rice and its top two import partners are Pakistan and France. 
The Comoros’ exports are predominantly clove, ylang-ylang and other essences for perfumes 
and the country exports mostly to Singapore, Turkey and France (Trading Economics 2016).  
 
The Republic of Mauritius is geographically considered to be part of Africa even though it is 
located in the Indian Ocean about 2 400 kilometres from the southeast coast of Africa. It is on 
good terms with its continental neighbours South Africa, Mozambique in particular as well as 
is immediate island neighbours Madagascar and the Seychelles. A practical example of one of 
these relationships is evident in the consolidation of a six-year long coordinated project by the 
Seychelles and Mauritius for the shared management of the Mascareignes plateau region, an 
extended continental shelf of around 396,000 sq km. By 2015 they had agreed to cooperate on 
matters related to ‘environmental protection, exploration and marine resources management, 
including fisheries and hydrocarbons’. They have also agreed to share the resources in the zone 
on a 50/50 basis (Seychelles News 2014 and 2015). 
 
The Mauritian economy is dependent on tourism, financial services, sugar, textiles, and 
prospects related to advanced technologies10 (Stiglitz 2011). Their imports exceed their 
exports, and are mainly oil, food and manufactured goods. Mauritian main exports are sugar 
and clothing and its main export partner is the European Union, though South Africa, the 
United States and Madagascar are other important partners (Trading Economics 2016). Despite 
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this the government does have plans, stipulated in its 2015 programme (2015, 43), to ‘actively 
pursue deepened economic engagement with Africa … in a manner that Mauritius becomes 
recognised as an important economic gateway to Africa.’ Stiglitz (2011) calls Mauritius a 
successful emerging-market country, a success he ascribes to: high levels of social cohesion, 
welfare and economic growth; very little military spending, which it considers to be wasteful; 
a strong commitment to democratic institutions; and in the absence of exploitable natural 
resources, Mauritius has spent money on the appreciation of its human resources. Grynberg 
(2013), on the other hand, considers Mauritius’ economic ‘miracle’ label to be down to ‘luck’ 
and assistance from the EU, the US and India in the form of the 1975 Lomé Convention, the 
US Agricultural Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and a double taxation agreement 
between India and Mauritius, which exempts Mauritian firms from Indian capital gains tax 
respectively. Despite the diverging views on the sources of Mauritian economic success, it is 
apparent that trade is a primary determinant in guiding Mauritian foreign policy. Aside from 
its regional economic partners, the Mauritian government considers, aside from those 
mentioned above, India, China and Pakistan also to be key trading partners. Indeed ‘the main 
thrust of Mauritius’s foreign policy is … to protect its preferential access to developed markets 
and cultivate inflows of [FDI] and financial relationships’ (Mauritius Foreign Policy and 
Government Guide 2011, 86). According to its SADC online profile, the ‘national objective is 
to graduate Mauritius from the current status of upper middle income country to the league of 
high-income nations by the 2020s’ (SADC 2012). 
 
The Seychelles is a SID in the Western Indian Ocean, although technically it is an archipelago 
of 115 islands. Like Mauritius, the Seychelles’ imports (petroleum products, manufactured 
goods and machinery) greatly exceed its exports, which are heavily dependent on its fishing 
industry, fish being its primary natural resource especially tuna and prawns. Its import partners 
include France, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Spain. It also exports to France and South 
Africa, the UK and others in the EU. Tourism is the Seychelles’ primary industry (Trading 
Economics 2016). 
 
Namibia, formerly South West Africa, is the largest southern African small state and also the 
youngest in terms of independence, which it attained from South Africa in 1990. Namibia has 
an Atlantic seaboard to the West and is surrounded to the north by Angola, northeast, Zambia, 
to the East, Botswana and to the South, South Africa. It therefore considers bilateral relations 
with these countries to be of paramount importance to Namibia’s national interests11 (Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs 2004, 72-73). Namibia imports food products, petroleum products and fuel, 
machinery and equipment and chemicals mostly from South Africa, the Netherlands, the UK 
and China (Trading Economics 2016). It also exports mainly to South Africa and the UK with 
diamonds making up a quarter of total exports, which also include uranium, lead, zinc, tin, 
silver, tungsten, food and live animals and manufactured products (Trading Economics 2016). 
Most of its exports are natural resources which also include copper, gold, lithium, cadmium, 
salt, and hydropower. Namibia is economically interdependent on the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), through which it receives a substantial chunk of its national budget, 
and South Africa, against whose currency the Namibian Dollar is pegged (Bosl 2014, 7). Trade 
forms a principal part of Namibia’s bilateral relations and as such the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry often informs foreign policy choices and undertakes economic diplomacy in 
Namibia’s bilateral relations (Mushelenga 2014, 74). 
 
Membership in international organisations 
The Comoros joined the United Nations in 1975 and is a member of the Arab League, the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and a host of other international bodies. It is also a 
member of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), along with the Seychelles, Mauritius, 
Madagascar and Reunion (France). Despite their heterogeneous characters, for example the 
Comoros is one of the least developed countries and Mauritius falls within upper middle 
income countries, the five IOC member countries share geographical proximity and common 
environmental challenges. Mauritius is active in various regional and continental organisations, 
including SADC, African Union (AU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). 
Its regional integration division, referred to above, monitors these groupings ‘with an aim to 
assist in expanding the economic space of Mauritius to achieve sustainable development 
through the regional route’. Internationally, Mauritius is a member of the Commonwealth and 
the United Nations (UN)12among about 50 other organisations. The Mauritian government 
considers its election to important international bodies as well as its membership and 
Presidency of the UN Security Council as achievements. Mauritius holds SADC and the AU 
in high regard as it harmonises its foreign policy with the goals of those international 
organisations (The Ministry 2016).  
 
The Seychelles is a member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the AU, the 
Commonwealth, International Monetary Fund (IMF), IOC and Indian Ocean Rim-Association 
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for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), La Francophonie, and the UN among others. It is also 
a member of COMESA and SADC. As a result of financial and human resource deficiencies, 
the Seychelles had to withdraw from SADC but re-joined in 2008. During the Seychelles’ 
Presidency of the IOC, the organisation set up the IOC piracy cell in the Seychelles, established 
regional development programs such as the ‘Vanilla Islands’ project and participated in the 
Madagascar Political crisis roadmap (MFA 2016).  
 
Namibia has membership in 46 international organisations, among them the UN, 
Commonwealth, SADC, AU, SACU and African Development Bank (AfDB). Namibia is 
essentially a child of the UN and therefore it comes as no surprise that it would want to maintain 
an active role within the organisation. Indeed within less than a decade of independence (in 
1990) the Republic assumed a non-permanent term on the UN Security Council (1999-2000).  
 
Security (military, environmental, economic, maritime) 
According to the Comoros’ Minister of External Relations and Cooperation, Mohamed 
Abdoulkari (2015), his country, being “a small island”, is dependent on the ocean as its main 
resource and therefore preservation of the oceans is vital for the future of the Comoros.  
Moreover, scarce natural resources and its physical insularity make food security a challenge 
for the Comoros. Less than 15 years ago the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 58/120 on special emergency economic assistance for the recovery and the 
development of the Comoros. In terms of military security, the Comorian Security Force has a 
500-member defense force and France provides naval assistance for the protection of territorial 
waters.  
 
Mauritius has no standing army. Food security is a concern and the Government has a dedicated 
Ministry to attend to this challenge. Unlike Mauritius, the Seychelles has an armed force, the 
Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF). According to the SPDF, the reason for its 
existence is not dissimilar to any other nation’s need for a defence force, including protection 
against external aggression and maintaining territorial integrity. The Seychelles is strategically 
important in the Indian Ocean and the Government of Seychelles has entered into several 
agreements with international partners, including the United States, to protect its territory and 
economy especially from threats of piracy. Security, therefore, has a direct bearing on foreign 
policy formulation as piracy in the Seychelles’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) had increased 
in the last two decades, threatening tourism and the fishing industry, the two most important 
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sources of the Seychelles’ income. Although now there is general consensus that piracy seems 
to be lessening in the region, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Transport still considers it to 
be a threat to the Seychelles’ maritime security (MFA 2016). 
 
According to the Republic’s Constitution (Chapter 15, article 115), the Namibian Defence 
Force (NDF) is tasked with defending the national interests of Namibia and safeguarding its 
territorial integrity. It assists domestic authorities when asked and provides support in UN, AU 
or SADC peacekeeping missions (MoD 2016). Compared to the other four southern African 
small states, in 2014 Namibia spent the most on its military, around $550 million, compared 
with $300 million (Botswana); $80 million (Swaziland); $48 million (Lesotho); $33 million 
(Mauritius), and $15 million (Seychelles) (SIPRI 2015). Territorial integrity13 is key to 
determining Namibia’s foreign policy as was clearly the case when Namibia’s initial foreign 
policy steps post-independence included the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the offshore 
islands (the ‘Penguin Islands’) as Namibian sovereign territory. Walvis Bay had been under 
South African control until March 1994. The enclave is of strategic economic importance to 
Namibia as it is the only deep-water port in the country and as such it is vital to Namibia’s 
‘economic development, maritime security, and foreign trade relations’ (du Pisani 2014, 372). 
Since 2004, additional security concerns became evident in Namibia’s White Paper on Foreign 
Policy and Diplomacy Management, including the environment, marine resources, and 
economic security (to be ensured through regional integration, FDI and trade diversification) 
(du Pisani 2014, 379).  
 
Colonial and cultural ties 
The Comoros gained its independence from France in July 1975. As mentioned above, the 
unresolved issue of the island of Mayotte remains a bone of contention for the Comoros. 
However, France offers support to the Comoros as a trading partner and in terms of military 
aid among other avenues and as such the Comoros foreign relations with France remain vital, 
however complex (Massey and Baker 2009, 23). Despite this reliance on France, this has not 
prevented the efforts of the Presidents of the Comoros to “widen Comoros’ diplomatic and 
commercial ties” (Massey and Baker 2009, 4). For example, in December 2013 the Comoros’ 
President Dhoinine undertook a state visit to Oman in order to establish better bilateral relations 
and cooperation with Oman (Oman Observer 2013). Efforts such as these have resulted “in an 
exceptionally diverse foreign policy for such a small state” (Massey and Baker 2009, 4). 
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Mauritius is a former Dutch, French and British (1814-1968) colony. The implication of this is 
a continuing strong link with France and the United Kingdom (UK). Mauritius is a voluntary 
member of the Commonwealth since 1968. The Mauritian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Etienne 
Sinatambou, declared in a 14 March 2016 speech that Mauritius takes ‘pride in its membership 
of the Commonwealth … an organisation that is a champion of Small States.’ Mauritius also 
joined the International Organization of the Francophonie in 1970 and remains culturally linked 
to France in language, media and business. Mauritius also has historical and ethnic ties with 
India, in light of its majority (68%) Indo-Mauritian population. Despite its close ties with the 
UK, Mauritius continues to actively pursue, at the United Nations in particular, its dispute over 
what Mauritius claims to be its sovereign territory, the Chagos Archipelago, illegally held by 
the UK. According to the Mauritian Constitution, Mauritian territory includes among others 
the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia (home to a US military base) (Mauritius 
Government Programme 2015-2019, 44). It is apparent that Mauritius uses its historical 
connections to its commercial advantage. It also uses various multilateral platforms to promote 
its climate change diplomacy. For example, Mauritius was the first state to sign the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in June 1992.  The Seychelles 
is also a former French colony and British territory until its independence in 1976. Like 
Mauritius, the Seychelles is a member of La Francophonie. According to Namibia’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (2004, 77), because of historical reasons, Southwest Africa had been a 
German colony until 1915, present relations between the two states remain ‘of a special 
character … and multi-faceted’. Areas of contact with Germany relate to trade, tourism, 
investment and development. 
 
 
Type of government or political system 
The Comoros’ presidency rotates between the country's three islands Grande Comore, 
Anjouan, and Moheli. Voting irregularities in the latest presidential election in 2016 resulted 
in a partial poll re-run after which Azali Assoumani was named the victor. The Comoros has 
experienced decades of insurrection and civil war since independence in 1975. However, 
according to the 2016 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance the Comoros has shown 
improvement in terms of domestic safety and rule of law, something that the Comoros will be 
seeking to advertise in order to attract much needed foreign investment. UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon (2016) referred to the 2016 elections as “an important step in the consolidation 
of democracy” in the Comoros.  
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Since independence Mauritius has been a parliamentary democracy. It is ranked first in Africa 
in terms of its democratic performance, affirmed in Gumede’s (2016) view as consistently 
stable and in fact in the stages of deepening its democracy; and first for good governance by 
the 2015 Economist’s Democracy Index and the 2014 Mo Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG) respectively. Mauritius links its domestic commitment to democracy to its 
foreign policy goals of promoting democratic ideals abroad. The Seychelles is a multi-party 
representative democracy and although there are areas for improvement it is ranked at number 
six out of 54 on the IIAG with a score of 7 out of 10 in overall governance, which includes: 
safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and 
human development (see Table 1.1 earlier in this article for data on the Seychelles’ Human 
Development Index ranking). Namibia is a presidential representative democratic republic. It 
places great value on a sustained participatory democracy as a source of its domestic political 
stability and as a foundation for regional peace, security and political stability (du Pisani 2014, 
379). 
 
The landlocked states 
According to Botswana’s permanent mission to the UN, Botswana sees itself as a small, poor 
state. Botswana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MOFAIC 2016) 
is tasked with advancing the country’s domestic interests encompassing national principles of 
democracy and Therisanyo (consultation), territorial integrity, sovereignty, development, self-
reliance, good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence among others. These domestic 
interests are vouched within Botswana’s broader interests, including regional integration, the 
promotion of trade, investment and tourism, promoting Botswana’s image internationally, the 
search for development and technical assistance, and the promotion of international peace and 
security. The Kingdom of Lesotho’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations 
(2016) aims to protect Lesotho’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to adhere to the UN 
principles of non - interference in internal affairs of other states, and to advance and enhance 
Lesotho’s prosperity through the maintenance of good relations with the international 
community. Using rather feisty language, the Ministry’s vision involves ‘jealously guarding 
Lesotho’s political and socio-economic interests in a rapidly globalizing world’. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation aims to advance the Kingdom of Swaziland’s 
national interest, enhance national security, project a positive image of Swaziland, grow the 
economy, and foster public understanding of the state’s foreign policy.14 As part of King 
Mswati III’s Government Programme of Action for Swaziland 2013-2018 (2013, 1), the 
18 
 
projected aspiration of Swaziland becoming a ‘first world country’ by 2022, necessitates 
increased FDI among other improvements. Good quality FDI brings with it capital, technical 
expertise and equipment, and access to international markets. This is to be achieved through 
the marketing of Swaziland’s new brand: Africa’s New Promise. According to the Programme 
(2013, 1), a first world country is defined as:  
 one where all citizens are able to sustainably pursue their life goals, and enjoy lives of 
 value and dignity in a safe and secure environment. This implies equitable access to 
 sufficient resources, education, health, food security and quality infrastructure and 
 services, as well as good governance. 
 
When it comes to international cooperation, the Kingdom of Swaziland aims to keep bilateral 
ties with its friends and ‘where possible, play an active part in continental and global initiatives’ 
(Government Programme of Action 2013-2018, 20).  
 
Trade, economics and geopolitics 
As a LLS, Botswana is dependent on its neighbours, South Africa to the south, Namibia to the 
west, and Zimbabwe to the east. Botswana is a middle income, developing state. Botswana 
imports food, fuel, machinery, beverages, tobacco, machinery and vehicles among other 
imports. South Africa is Botswana’ main import partner. The other 25% of total imports come 
from China, Israel, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Trading Economics 2016). The state’s main 
export partners are the UK, South Africa, Israel and Belgium and nearly two-thirds of its total 
exports are diamonds. Other exports include copper and nickel, beef and textiles. Although the 
diamond industry has been key to an independent foreign policy for Botswana in the past, as 
its main driver of growth, (see Niemann 1993), the Government is trying to diversify its 
economy. Moreover, as Taylor and Mokhawa (2003, 280-283) contend, the diamond industry 
has at times tainted Botswana’s otherwise clean, democratic reputation since its independence 
in 196615. Nevertheless, any potential damage to image has not impacted Botswana‘s rankings. 
It was ranked at number 72 out of 189 states in 2015 in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business 
Index (2015). In 2015 Mauritius ranked at no. 32, the Seychelles at no. 95, Namibia at no. 101, 
Swaziland at no. 105, and Lesotho at no. 114.  
 
Lesotho is a small LLS and as such it is already dependent on its neighbours. However, what 
is most challenging in Lesotho’s case is that it is an enclave LLS, that is, completely surrounded 
by one state - South Africa. Therefore as Kapa (2007, 117-132) suggests Lesotho’s foreign 
policy will always be determined by South Africa’s national interests. This depicts a trapped 
19 
 
sovereign state with little or no autonomy. Mahlakeng and Hussein (2013, 35) add that enclave 
LLS’ economic and political existence ‘may depend heavily upon the benevolence of their 
encircling neighbours’. It is no surprise then that Lesotho exports mainly clothing and 
diamonds mostly to South Africa, but also to the US. It imports food, fuel, machinery and 
building materials mostly from South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US and South 
Africa (Trading Economics 2016). The country’s natural resources include diamonds, wildlife, 
mohair, wool and water. South Africa is dependent on Lesotho’s rivers in terms of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project as a water supply for Gauteng province, which is also a source of 
income and hydroelectric power for Lesotho. South Africa is subject to potential spill-over 
effects and negative consequences as a result of political instability in Lesotho (see below). 
 
Swaziland has been referred to as the Switzerland of Africa, but only due to its mountainous 
topography. It is a lower middle income LLS surrounded by South Africa apart from its north- 
eastern border with Mozambique. Its natural resources include sugar, food products, wood pulp 
and wildlife. More than three-quarters of Swaziland’s total imports are from South Africa, and 
include food, fuels and machinery. It also imports from Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia 
to a smaller extent. In 2015 Swaziland exported more than it imported, unlike the five other 
small states in this paper, something which has assisted with the state’s medium term growth. 
Its main exports include sugar, wood pulp, cotton and beef and are destined for South Africa, 
Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Norway (Trading Economics 2016). Swaziland relies 
on revenue from SACU, which is unpredictable and on the decline, preferential trade 
agreements and economic partnerships. Agriculture and tourism are prominent industries. Like 
Lesotho (Loti), Swaziland’s currency (Lilangeni) is pegged to the Rand and such is vulnerable 
to changes in South Africa’s economy.  
 
Security (military, environmental, economic, maritime) 
Although Botswana’s Defence Force (BDF) is small compared with neighbours Angola and 
South Africa, it has nevertheless played a professional role in regional peace operations (Henk 
2004, 85). Lesotho’s Defence Force (LDF) has had a rather different reputation. Since 
independence in 1966, Lesotho has experienced several periods of political instability and 
insecurity including military involvement in politics (coups in May 1991, September 1998, and 
August 2014). The LDF is a source of serious instability for political authorities. Additionally, 
according to Matlosa (2005, 102), Lesotho’s ‘external security horizon is overwhelmingly 
dependent on South Africa’; and whereas Lesotho was once referred to as the granary of 
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southern Africa, it is now experiencing food insecurity, as is Swaziland. Two-thirds of 
Swaziland’s population suffer from chronic food insecurity, as droughts and water insecurity 
also plague the sugar cane industry. Swaziland has an army, the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence 
Force (USDF), but details on how large it is remain sketchy. Moreover as Swaziland has ‘no 
natural enemies’, considering that a Swazi attack on South Africa or Mozambique would mean 
probable suicide, reasons for a standing army remain elusive although there is a suggestion that 
the forces are there solely to protect the King against any popular uprisings (Nxumalo 2011).  
 
Membership in international organisations 
Botswana is a member of SADC (SADC headquarters are based in Gaborone, Botswana), 
SACU, the AU, the UN, the Commonwealth and a host of other international organisations.  
Membership in international organisations affords small states particular advantages, according 
to Botswana’s Permanent Mission to the UN (2008), and as such Botswana places ‘high value’ 
on its membership. The UN is considered to be particularly important because as it is based in 
New York, Botswana has more immediate access to more contacts than its development 
priorities in its bilateral relations would otherwise allow and thereby provides a platform upon 
which to promote Botswana’s interests abroad. Lesotho is also a member of SADC, SACU, 
the UN, the AU, the Commonwealth and other organisations. Lesotho is dependent on 
maintaining its international memberships which must be considered of benefit to the state, as 
was recently demonstrated in media reports. SADC threatened Lesotho with suspension if 
Lesotho Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili would not receive and release the SADC report 
investigating the assassination in June 2015 of the former head of the LDF, Brigadier 
Maaparankoe Mahao (Africa News Agency 2016). Lesotho agreed in order to avoid 
suspension. In an historical example, in September 1998, under the auspices of SADC, South 
Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho, in what was named Operation Boleas, to restore 
the rule of law and quash high levels of post-electoral political instability and rioting in 
Lesotho. There was controversy over this intervention, South Africa being accused of using its 
dominance in the region to meddle in Lesotho’s affairs. The incident was evidence of the 
vulnerable nature of this LLS to be able to protect and maintain its territorial integrity. 
Swaziland too is a member of over 40 international organisations including the AU, SADC, 
SACU, UN, and Commonwealth. Six southern African small states are members of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), an organisation created in 1975 whose objectives 
include reducing poverty levels in member states and promoting sustainable development.  
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Colonial and cultural ties 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are all former British colonies until their independence in 
1968, 1966 and 1968 respectively and, as mentioned above, all have since voluntarily joined 
the Commonwealth, formerly known as the British Commonwealth. Since independence a 
large part of these states’ foreign policies were directed at bringing about majority rule in 
apartheid South Africa. They were part of the Frontline States and in many respects seen as 
‘South Africa’s achilles heel’. However, it was difficult for these states to isolate South Africa, 
due to their geographical location and economic reliance on the Republic. The states remain 
economically dependent on a democratic South Africa although their focus is now on good 
neighbourliness with their dominant neighbour.  
 
Type of government or political system 
The Republic of Botswana is a parliamentary representative democracy. It ranks highly in most 
democracy indices, for example, it moved up five places over a period of four years, according 
to Campbell, Pölzlbauer, Barth and Pölzlbauer’s (2015) study on world democracy rankings. 
A very real trigger for Botswana’s foreign policy behaviour relates to its eastern neighbour and 
the challenge of illegal immigrants (or refugees) fleeing Zimbabwe’s economic collapse and 
political instability and taking up residence in Botswana. Botswana has a population just over 
two million and therefore having to contend with a million or more Zimbabweans crossing its 
border and threatening to overwhelm the local population, as result of failed elections in  2008, 
impacted its foreign policy. Botswana’s President Ian Khama refused to acknowledge Robert 
Mugabe as legitimate Zimbabwean President after the 2008 presidential re-run. Although 
Botswana and Zimbabwe almost came to blows over this (see Malila and Molebatsi 2014, 11-
12), relations later thawed and some suggest that geopolitical concerns may have been the cause 
as a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Mozambique and Botswana was set up 
to jointly develop the port of Beira and build a railway link between the two countries. This 
MOU would require an amenable Zimbabwe whose territory would be needed for the railway 
(Malila and Molebatsi 2014, 16). Lesotho also has a parliamentary representative 
democratic system, but it is a constitutional monarchy. Although Swaziland is an absolute 
monarchy, the 2006 Constitution makes provision for a prime minister who is head of 
government and a cabinet, though with the King’s approval. Swaziland is a member of many 
organisations espousing democratic principles, and yet the single reference to democracy in the 
King’s Government Programme of Action 2013 – 2018 (2013, 16) is ‘monarchial democracy’ 
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a ‘marriage between the monarch and the ballot box’ and the Kingdom has banned political 
parties for the past 40 years.  
 
Conclusion 
Although this study provides a brief overview it is apparent that despite a globalising world, 
borders and location still matter. Geopolitics and regional context for the southern African 
small states directly impact on their national interests (economic, political and otherwise). 
Although location-related challenges may differ between the LLS of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, the island states of the Comoros, Mauritius and the Seychelles, and Namibia with 
a coastal border, there is a commonality in what drives their foreign policy: protection of 
territorial integrity. Moreover, it is clear that these states are driven in their foreign policy 
formulation by what they define as their national interests. For the Comoros national interest 
and territorial integrity are one and the same as is evident in Comoros’ persistent calls at the 
UN to have Mayotte recognised as part of the Union. Namibia and Botswana, for example, 
safeguard their interests through the promotion of good neighbourliness, and regional peace 
and cooperation because in one view they are aware of the advantages of peace to a prosperous 
economy and a prosperous economy implies positive spinoffs for their citizenries, and therefore 
is of national interest. The Seychelles’ foreign policy is driven by the need to boost its tourism 
industry as a major source of income, to ascertain ways to mitigate the consequences of climate 
change, and to lessen piracy-related insecurities. These foreign policy objectives are of priority 
interest to this small state. Although Lesotho might be asymmetrically dependent on South 
African interests for its survival, South Africa too is aware of the troubles it faces when there 
is instability in the small state. In that respect Lesotho is aware of the unmistakable role played 
by regional security initiatives in its own national security. For Mauritius trade, the country’s 
small size, colonial links, and commitment to democratic governance are driving forces behind 
its foreign policy. Like Lesotho, Swaziland’s foreign policy in practice is influenced by its 
geography and asymmetrical relations with South Africa, its largest neighbour.  
  
The Comoros, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles and Swaziland also 
share similarities in their self-described status of ‘small state’ and the need to participate 
meaningfully in regional and international organisations, again with a view to protecting their 
state interests. This description is not necessarily a negative; indeed these states also aim, in 
their foreign policy documents, to project positive images of their states abroad. It is more a 
matter of fact than perception. As Handel suggested, small state survival does matter, in this 
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case more to the Comoros, Lesotho and Swaziland, which are perhaps the least well off in 
many respects (in terms of political and economic survival) compared with their regional small 
state counterparts. In contrast, however, although facing climate change challenges that are 
risking their very existence on the map, the Seychelles and Mauritius are through context, 
circumstance and diplomatic skill, attempting to use their small status to their advantage and 
are proactively playing their roles in international relations, especially in relation to the blue 
economy. Historical context plays a role in determining foreign policy in these southern 
African small states. Apart from the Comoros which was a French colony, the other six small 
states are former British territories and chose to become members of the Commonwealth of 
Nations upon independence. Another shared factor influencing foreign policy is trade, which 
is essential to all seven small states. Often colonial ties are apparent in trading partnerships and 
whether or not this is regarded by some as continued unfair dependence of some sort, the reality 
is that the small states rely on these links. Small state currencies too are vulnerable to global 
market forces, and especially when they are pegged to a regional power’s currency such as 
South Africa’s Rand.  
 
Their foreign policy decisions may also be influenced by context-specific complexities, not 
explored in this study. Leadership, type of government and foreign policy decision making, for 
example, only briefly touched upon here in respect of Botswana’s President Khama, might be 
a significant determining factor in small states’ foreign policy choices. Some might suggest 
that Swaziland’s absolute monarch, King Mswati III, despite the rhetoric in government 
policies, rules in many respects in favour of his personal interest and not in the national interest. 
Domestic challenges such as health issues, HIV and AIDS rates for example, and the role these 
play in foreign policy choices, have also not been explored in this study.  Domestic stakeholders 
in foreign policy formulation are not included, although brief mention was made of the impact 
an NGO might have on state image, which is of interest to a state, in this case Botswana and 
its diamond industry.  
 
However, state size, at least this in the case of these small states, appears to be the ‘why’ behind  
the shaping of foreign policy but only in the sense that it informs the typical drivers of many, 
if not most, states’ foreign policies: protecting territorial integrity; promoting national interests; 
projecting a positive image abroad; participating meaningfully in international organisations, 
taking history into account in identifying foreign policy goals; and setting up beneficial trading 
relations. That is to say, what drives southern Africans small states’ foreign policies is not 
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atypical from other larger states. What is more apparent is that despite commonalities shared 
by the southern African small states in their foreign policies, their sovereign independence 
remains important to each state. After all these seven small states are quite diverse, ranging 
from democracies to an absolute monarchy, from having consistent political stability to 
constant instability, and from having high middle income economic status to low income status. 
As such priorities differ even if their foreign policy objectives are influenced by very similar 
national interests; and all seven states have active foreign policies, to different degrees. For 
southern African small states, first place in a global race may never be realised but that does 
not disqualify them from participating. 
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Notes 
1 In terms of the global economy, Vickers (2011, 185) describes small states (or small 
vulnerable economies) as marginal players. 
 
2 Crowards (2002) adds ‘trade openness … total exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP’ 
and ‘net foreign direct investment [FDI]’, as indirect variables, to his quantifiable definitions 
of the size of a state, arguing in the case of FDI that presumably small states would attract 
smaller FDI, compared to larger states, due to limited capacity. This indicator would be 
important then in terms of determining the influence a state may have in influencing decisions 
beyond its borders. According to the World Bank (2015), in 2014, the FDI of the five southern 
Africa states examined in this paper were as follows: Botswana (USD 393,180,125); Lesotho 
(USD 46,521,786); Mauritius (USD 418,430,128); Namibia (USD 493,302,263); Seychelles 
(USD 108,307,072) and Swaziland (USD 26,584,894). 
 
3.  Even within small state theory, you can refer to small developed states (mostly in Europe), 
or small developing states; or small island developing states (SIDS). 
 
4 Geopolitics relates to how state location, natural resources and physical environment, 
including regional context, are important in helping to explain certain foreign policy choices 
(Breuning 2007, 47).  
 
5 Although these characteristics are not exclusive to small states, for example even large states 
may experience remoteness due to the widespread settlements of rural populations, they do, 
however, reveal as a collective the degree to which small states must face these challenges 
compared with larger states (The Commonwealth 1997, 12). 
 
6 For discussion on small state use of balancing or bandwagoning in their international relations 
see Gunasekara 2015 and Gvalia and Siroky et al. 2013. 
 
7 Literature pertaining to African foreign policies and related processes reflects slightly more 
favourably in number, see more recent examples in: Herbert (2011); Akokpari 2001; 
Khadiagala and Lyons 2001; Adar and Ajulu 2002. For an economic emphasis on small states 
in SADC–European Union (EU) negotiations, see Vickers 2011. 
  
8 Mayotte became an official overseas Department for France in 2011. 
 
9 Blue economy refers to the sustainability of the world’s oceans by ‘ensuring that economic 
activity is in balance with the long-term capacity of ocean ecosystems to support this activity 
and remain resilient and healthy’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015, 7).  
 
10 Although, according to the World Economic Forum (2016) more can yet be done to boost 
Mauritius’ technological readiness; which sits at a score of 4.1 (with 7 being the best possible 
score). 
 
11 That is not to say that Namibia has enjoyed uninterrupted congenial relations with Botswana, 
for example. The two states were in dispute over the boundary of Kasikili/Sedudu Island, 
located on the north-eastern international border between Botswana and Namibia, from 1992-
1999, although a decision was finalised in 2003 (du Pisani 2014, 375-377). 
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12 Mauritius served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time 
in 1977 and 1978. In October 2000, Mauritius was elected for a two-year term (2001-2002) at 
the Security Council. Botswana and Namibia have also served on the Council in 1995-1996 
and 1999-2000 respectively. Seychelles, in agreement with its east African neighbours, 
temporarily withdrew its bid to occupy a 2017-2018 non-permanent seat on the Council, but 
aspires to represent Africa in the 2021-2022 term.  
 
13 See discussion on the Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute in du Pisani 2014 (375-377). 
 
14 Swaziland’s King Mswati III had no qualms in 2006, attempting to enlarge his Kingdom’s 
territory, claiming parts of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal from South Africa. Former 
South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkhosazana Dlamini Zuma quashed these claims 
in 2012 on the basis that AU protocol observes borders drawn up during colonial times 
(Simelane 2014). 
15 See Taylor and Mokhawa’s (2003) review of Botswana’s diamond industry and related 
NGO, Survival International’s, allegations of the government’s ill-treatment of the San 
people. 
